Prior analyses of whether racial bias was a prevalent feature of New York City's Stop-and-Frisk program implicitly assumed that while the decision to stop a pedestrian may depend on their race, the potential bias of a police officer did not vary by crime and their decision of which type of crime to report as the basis for the stop did not exhibit any bias. In this paper, we first extend the hit rates model to consider crime type heterogeneity in racial bias and police officer decisions of reported crime type. Second, we reevaluate the program while accounting for heterogeneity in bias along crime types and for the sample-selection which may arise from conditioning on crime type. We present evidence that differences in biases across crime types are substantial and specification tests support incorporating corrections for selective crime reporting. However, the main findings on racial bias do not differ sharply once accounting for this choice based selection.
Introduction
In many administrative and survey data sets, researchers must confront the challenge that non-sampling errors due to deliberate bias in providing a response may distort the analyses.
Much research has investigated this issue in survey research (see Bound et al. (2001) for a survey of the literature) and the presence of measurement errors has been shown to cause biased and inconsistent parameter estimates thereby leading to erroneous conclusions to various degrees in statistical and economic analysis. Different methods are needed to treat measurement errors in survey data since these errors can arise from different sources. For example, they might arise from coding errors by surveyors or survey participants may choose to not provide truthful responses. Subjects may not provide accurate responses either due to recall error, 1 fatigue from answering multiple questions 2 or from social stigma, among other potential rationales.
A specific form of measurement error arises with qualitative data resulting in misclassification. Misclassification occurs when observations are placed erroneously in a different group or category. Within administrative data sources, this erroneous information is provided not from survey responses, but rather in how records are generated and maintained. Just as certain issues may influence those being surveyed, it may also affect those who maintain administrative records. For example, individuals preparing entries in administrative records may rely on rules of thumb in a bid to minimize the burden of completing the underlying forms accurately. These errors in classification not only affect summary statistics on sample proportions but may influence analyses that investigate heterogenous behavioral relationships across these groups or categories. 3 In many settings, economic theory would suggest that we should expect heterogeneity across these groups or categories, 4 and this heterogeneity may be not only policy-relevant, but would be completely masked when investigating data on the full sample.
We illustrate the importance of considering the consequences of misclassification that can arise from using rules of thumb to determine categories by reevaluating if there is racial discrimination in New York Citys infamous Stop-and-Frisk program, in which officers can stop and frisk anyone they believe has committed, is committing, or might commit a crime. These policing practices often disproportionately target minorities, generating sig- 
Advocacy groups have long criticized the New York City Police Department's (NYPD)
Stop-and-Frisk program, 5 and have even suggested that it has effectively turned some neighborhoods -usually poor and nonwhite ones -into occupied territories rife with unnecessary, tense interactions between neighborhood residents and the police. More generally across all neighborhoods, surveys increasingly document that the American law enforcement community is coming under increasing scrutiny and criticism and the levels of trust in the police have plummeted. 6 While proponents of the NYPD Stop-and-Frisk program such as former NYPD commissioner Ray Kelly claim it has saved over 7000 lives and played a key role in the city's decrease in crime over the past years, opponents claim it constitutes a billing records. They found that the specificity of survey questions that measure mammography use is lower among black women than white women.
violation of freedom and provides a means for officers to engage in racial profiling. These claims are based in part on unconditional summary statistics such as the fact that the overwhelming majority of those targeted by the program (consistently around 85% of all stops in each year) are minorities. The use of unconditional summary statistics to suggest that there is evidence of racial discrimination has been made by advocacy groups at almost every stage of the criminal justice system. lowering the likelihood of those outcomes for that racial minority. 8 This test has been applied in prior research evaluating the NYPD Stop-and-Frisk program. Coviello and Persico (2015) find no evidence of discrimination against African-Americans in the aggregate sample of all recorded crime types in the whole city over ten years but, along with Goel et al. (2016) , do find evidence of discrimination against African-Americans when restricting the sample to only stops relating to the possession of a concealed weapon.
Studies that explore racial discrimination in the economics literature at other stages of the criminal justice system make clear that these may be non-discriminatory and one needs to account for racial differences in crime prevalence. Yet, even after taking this feature into account, there is evidence of racial prejudice at other stages. Anwar and Fang (2015) for studies looking at prejudice in prosecution, bail-setting, sentencing, prison releases as well as in judges and juries. 8 In other words, police officers who stop more members of a certain racial group would not be racially biased if these stops are productive and lead to arrests or summons. In addition, this test can account for the empirical features related to the geographic concentration of crime across neighbourhoods. 9 For completeness, other research evaluating Stop-and-Frisk include Gelman et al. (2007) and Ridgeway (2012) who each use a different subset of the data employed in the Coviello and Persico (2015) study. Lehrer and Lepage (2017) also use the Stop-and-Frisk data to test for discrimination against Arab-Americans and find evidence consistent with racial profiling in periods of high terrorism threat. Regarding the use of nonlethal force, Fryer (2016) finds that blacks are over 50% more likely than whites to have force used against them when stopped.
We add to the existing evidence on the importance of accounting for potential heterogeneity in bias across different types of crimes by showing its potential importance in theory and confirming it empirically. African-Americans constitute the overwhelming majority of suspects arrested for crimes related to drugs or possession of a weapon, two classifications that we closely investigate in our analysis since similarly to the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk program, the long-lasting nationwide War on Drugs has been suggested to be discriminatory given disparate impacts for African-Americans.
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Prior research using Stop-and-Frisk data has also treated the reported crime classifications as being exogenous. However, these classifications are selected by individual police officers at the time when they complete the mandated forms indicating why they stopped a given suspect. If individual police officers have perceptions of a specific race being the perpetrators of certain types of crime, 11 these classifications might be subject to unconscious bias. In other words, conditioning on those reported crime categories leads to endogenous stratification, which is well-known to lead to biased estimates. Coviello and Persico (2015) discuss whether one should restrict the analysis to only stops that legally must be recorded.
They conclude that this would require the implausible assumption that at the time of choosing whom to stop, the officer could distinguish whether the stop will develop into one that has to be recorded or not.
That analysis does not consider the decision we focus on, which is taken by the officer at the time of choosing whom to stop and must also define the basis for the stop. While we illustrate the issue of analyzing effects on subgroups that may be misclassified with
Stop-and-Frisk data, we should stress that these issues are becoming increasingly prevalent in survey data. 12 Further, misclassification has been shown to have consequences for econometric estimates David (1997, 2001) conclusions. Generally, the consequence of misclassification depends on how it occurred.
However, misclassification in this setting is not simply a measurement error problem since research conduct analyses on subgroups defined by the misclassified variable thereby generating a choice based sample. If misclassification of the subgroup occurs to the same degree across each racial group and Stop and Frisk outcome, then there it is random and no bias should arise. Conversely, if the misclassification of the subgroup varies differently between the races, there is non-random misclassification. Since much research analyzes impacts on subgroups, we would argue that there is likely going to be an increase in misclassification in race and ethnicity variables as time progresses given changes in the meaning of these variables to survey respondents; so the methods we describe could be applied in various other contexts.
In this paper, we first extend the model underlying the hit rates test to account for an additional stage where police officer beliefs about guilt of specific crimes may depend on both the type of crime and the race of the suspect, thereby influencing the type of crime reported as the basis for the stop. This motivates investigating racial bias across different crime types which can reconciliate evidence in Coviello and Persico (2015) that the policy had no effects in the full sample of stops but also motivates the need to correct the estimates to account for potential bias in the reporting of crime categories. Second, we reevaluate whether there is evidence of racial discrimination in New York City's Stop-and-Frisk program by modeling the selection process of crime categories as a polychotomous choice. In effect, we implement a sample-selection correction to explicitly account for the relative impact that being AfricanAmerican may have on the difference in the likelihood of being stopped for certain types of crime when conducting the hit rates tests. To the best of our knowledge, this study presents the first use of a a polychotomous selection model to estimate whether there is evidence of racial discrimination in the economics of crime literature. Ohio, 392 U.S. in 1968 that was decided by the United-States Supreme Court. The Supreme court ruled that a police officer must have "a reasonable suspicion" of some wrongdoing to conduct a stop.
14 Most importantly, the Supreme Court's holding required the scope of any resulting police search to be narrowly tailored to match the original reason for the stop. In response to this ruling, New York's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was written which authorized police officers to stop private citizens in a public place only if the officer reasonably suspected that the citizen is committing, has committed or is about to commit either a felony or a misdemeanor. 15 Once such a stop has been made, New York law further authorizes a frisk of the suspect only if the officer "reasonably suspects that she is in danger of physical injury". Table 1 . 17 Approximately 84% of this sample is African-American and the vast majority of suspects are Male. Among the 13 categories of crimes reported in Table 1 , which account for over 95% of recorded stops, possession of a weapon (27.67%), robbery (17.30%), trespassing (11.84%) and drugs (11.11%) are the most commonly listed as the basis for a stop. At the base of the table, we pool these crime categories into four main classifications. 18 Drugs and weapon crimes are pooled together since they represent felonies linked to the US War on Drugs and account for nearly one-third of the stops. Similarly, we pool other major crimes by whether they are either economic in motivation (i.e. trespassing, burglary, robbery, grand larceny and grand larceny auto) or violent (i.e. assault, murder and rape). The final category consists of less severe offenses which include petit larceny, graffiti and criminal misconduct. Crimes of an economic nature account for over one-half of the stops, while there are very few stops associated with either violent crimes or minor crimes.
19 16 Our main results are robust to restricting the analysis only to those stops which had to be legally reported. Following Coviello and Persico (2015), we do not use this as a sampling restriction since it would condition on ex-post information. The external validity of the results rely on the plausible (yet untestable with this data) assumption that the sample is representative of all stops in the city. While one may worry that police officers under-report racially-sensitive stops that do not legally have to be reported, this would then underestimate the number of unproductive stops conducted on African-Americans and our results would constitute a lower-bound on the true magnitude of racial bias. This is consistent with the data, as the estimated arrest differential is larger when the hit rates test is applied to this selected subsample only. 17 We further exclude observations which were related to other crimes than those reported in Table 1 since in our analysis we group crimes within categories and including these crimes as an additional classification did not change the main results but led to large computational costs. This results in 2,547,165 observations; we excluded 451,598 observations due to missing crime category and 102,135 observations classified as other crimes (less than 5% of all crimes). 18 Our results do not depend on those categories; the estimates are quantitatively and qualitatively similar whether we only group War on Drugs crimes and leave the other crime types ungrouped or group violent and minor crimes in two categories while leaving others ungrouped. We selected these classifications ex ante and as such present them as the main results. 19 The low rate of stops for minor crimes, which likely consist of the majority of daily criminal activity in urban environments is relatively surprising. Police officers, in an effort to justify the stops, may be "too The first column of Table 2 documents the substantial heterogeneity in the average percentage of stops involving African-American suspects across crime types which range from 46.4%-93.4%. We observe that African-Americans have a lower rate of being stopped for graffiti than whites and also that less than 65% of all stops for burglary and criminal misconduct involve African-American suspects in our sample. In contrast, over 92% of all stops categorized as weapons, trespassing or murder feature an African-American suspect. The remaining columns provide summary information on the percentage of stops that resulted in an arrest by race and a test of whether there is a significant difference in these proportions between races. In nearly every crime category, African-Americans have on average lower rates of arrest relative to white suspects. Results from tests of the equality of proportion classified for a specific crime type between groups presented in the last column indicate that these racial differences are statistically significant at the 5% level in every category with the exception of stops classified as murder, rape and robbery. Most striking is that the rate of arrest for weapon possession stops is 75% higher for white suspects relative to AfricanAmericans, despite the fact that almost 19 of every 20 stops for this category involve a black suspect.
Theory
We begin by extending the model that underlies the hit rates test first developed in Knowles et al. (2001) to directly consider the Supreme Court's holding in Terry v. Ohio that the scope of any resulting police search has to be narrowly tailored to match the original reason for the stop. 20 Since the crime type must be reported and racial bias may differ across crime types if ambitious" in stating crime types to appear that they have a stronger rationale for the stop. Alternatively, police officers are likely to simply put more weight on serious offenses and may be less likely to stop pedestrians for minor crimes or to file the associated paperwork. 20 The KPT test was adapted to the Stop-and-Frisk setting in Coviello and Persico (2015) , whose model we extend. Our extension is also inspired by Anwar and Fang (2006) . Note that the KPT test has faced criticism in Dharmapala and Ross (2003) and Gelman et al. (2007) , among others. These critiques focus on allowing police officers to consider varying degrees of severity across types of crime, allowing for the fact that police officers have different beliefs relating to race for different crimes, they may associate a certain racial group with certain crime types and therefore would be more likely to be biased for stops related to those classes of infractions. Racial bias is likely to be unconscious in nature, particularly when police officers have limited time to decide whether or not to stop a pedestrian on the street. 21 We next incorporate this feature within an economic model that describes pedestrian and police officer behavior.
Pedestrians
We categorize pedestrians by their race r and a set of other costlessly-observable characteristics o. There are Q r,o pedestrians in each group (r, o). A pedestrian chooses from
..., a n } where a 0 is the outside option of not committing a crime (value of 0) and a i with k = 0 represents committing a specific crime of type k. Suppose that φ k represents the payoff from crime k = 1, ..., n while c k represents the cost of being caught for crime k which is constant across pedestrians. Also, let F r,o (φ 1 , ..., φ n ) denote the joint conditional distribution of φ 1 , ..., φ n given group (r, o) and ω denote the expected number of members of a given group that are searched.
The expected payoff of a pedestrian with type (r, o) and (φ 1 , .., φ n , c 1 , ..., c n ) who chooses to commit a crime with the expectation that ω other pedestrians of their type will be stopped is:
Let crime i be the maximizer of the previous expression. An agent commits a crime if officers frequently do not observe potential offenders or accounting for racial and neighborhood heterogeneity in the probability of guilt. We pursue a similar line of inquiry in further investigating heterogeneity along different types of crime, which prior work did not consider within the KPT framework. 21 Smith et al. (2006) provide evidence that police officers can develop unconscious biases along observable characteristics such as gender which affect their propensity to be suspicious of a member of that group under different circumstances. u r,o (φ 1 , ..., φ n , c 1, , ..., c n , ω) ≥ 0:
(ω) is the crime-dependent crime rate for group (r, o). This is the objective probability that an individual of group (r, o) is guilty of crime type i.
Police Officers
Given a mass M of police officers who, after having exogenously been allocated to a given precinct, receive a type p ∼ U [0, 1] . 22 Each officer type has a search capacity E p and a signal µ r,o p,i ∈ [0, 1] which represents the subjective probability that an officer of type p assigns to an individual of race r being guilty of crime i. 
The assignment of police officers across precincts is considered further in Coviello and Persico (2015) .
and corresponds to the situation where an officer of type p attaches a higher relative probability of guilt to members of race A for crime i.
Let
N p (r, o, i)dp be the total number of stops for group (r, o) and crime i.
, the expected payoff of an officer of type p is then given by:
where s p is the cost of performing a stop for the officer. An officer chooses to stop an
Existence of an equilibrium
The existence of an equilibrium for such non-atomic games is established in Schmeidler (1973) , o) ).
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix 1. Intuitively, as in the original hit rates model, it implies that if police officers are unbiased, then the crime rate for a specific type of crime has to be equal across races. In our case, this implies that the likelihood of arrest conditional on being stopped should be equal across races for a given type of crime.
On the other hand, if police officers are biased against race r, then the probability of being arrested when stopped for a specific type of crime must be lower for race r. Critically, this does not rule out that police officers be more or less biased against a specific racial group for different types of crimes.
The model first highlights that, if police officers have different beliefs about the probability of guilt across racial groups for certain crime types, then racial bias may not be uncovered using the traditional approach of pooling all crimes together. Rather, racial bias would not only differ across race but also across crime type, requiring the hit rates test to be performed conditioning on the crime type. It also highlights that, since police officers may have beliefs which vary across both race and crime classification (µ r,o p,i ), the decision to stop a suspect for a specific type of crime may also depend on race and should be accounted for in the hit rates analysis when conditioning on the crime type.
Empirical Strategy
The traditional hit rates test examines whether there is a racial difference in the percentage of stops that result in an arrest. This assumes that when running regressions on subgroups defined by type of crime classification, the subgroups are exogenous as assumed in both Coviello and Persico (2015) and Goel et al. (2016) 
where RACE s is a dummy variable for whether the suspect is African-American, X tp is a set of year and precinct fixed effects and ε sctp is an error term with zero mean. If β 1 is statistically significant, there is evidence of differential success rates of stops by race. Equation (1) corresponds to our baseline specification to investigate potential bias heterogeneity across types of crime.
In the theoretical model, a police officer's beliefs of how race is associated with crime type may influence stopping decisions, hence we have a choice based sample. That is, not only may beliefs about guilt differ across race, but the decision to classify a stop under a given crime category may also depend on race. The idea that there is implicit bias has been shown to hold for violent crime (Brigham (1971) ; Devine and Elliot (1995)) and more recently in a set of lab experiments. Correll et al. (2002) show evidence that undergraduate students playing a computer simulation were more likely to misinterpret neutral objects (e.g., wallet, cell phone) as weapons and mistakenly shoot when the suspect was a black person compared to a white person. Since bias may enter in at this classification stage, it is important to account for it and go beyond an analysis which conditions on crime type. An additional rationale for this may be that police officers are "too ambitious" in stating crime types to appear that they have a good reason for the stop. This is consistent with the relatively few number of stops for minor crimes presented in table 1 even though these crime categories are likely to account for a large share of daily criminal activity.
A two-step method allows us to address potential selection bias. 24 In the first step, an unordered multinomial logit model is used to explain the officer's choice of the criminal basis of the stop. Formally, for crime categories c = 1, ..., C, we assume logit errors and express the log-likelihood function as
where y s is a categorical variable representing which type of crime presented in Table 1 is the basis of the stop and covariates include the race of the suspect along with year and precinct fixed effects with a vector Z ctp used to identify the selection correction term. 25 The matrix Z ctp contains measures of the fraction of stops related to each of the four crime categories in a given precinct the day prior to the current stop. We argue these variables constitute a valid exclusion restriction given the likely state dependence in policing behavior at the precinct level. These are likely to be correlated to the decision of which crime type to currently stop a suspect for, but should not be related to unobserved factors that lead to individual arrests.
We also conduct the analysis using longer periods between the instruments and the stop date 24 The intuition and mechanics behind the approach we use is proposed in Bourguignon et al. (2007) and parallel the seminal Heckman (1979) two-step estimator. 25 Note that the inclusion of these fixed effects leads to the well-known incidental parameter problem but since the ratio of the number of observations to number of parameters is very high in our application, this suggests that issues of bias should be limited. On the other hand, by ignoring the fixed effects, the interpretation of the coefficients of the outcome equation would be unclear since a different set of coefficients enter the first stage and outcome equation. Thus, our preferred estimates given the large sample size for each precinct and year include fixed effects. For completeness, we present estimates using both approaches in the results section. The use of a conditional fixed effects estimator is also computationally infeasible in our setting.
which has limited impacts on the estimates. Specifically we consider the fraction of stops related to each of the four crime categories in a given precinct the week and month before the current stop.
Using estimates of equation (2) 
allowing one to obtain unbiased and consistent estimation of the βs by using weighted least squares for each crime category subgroup. The consequence of misclassification for the analysis depends on how it occurred. The direction of bias depends on the correlation between unobservables in the outcome and selection equations. If police officers are more likely to misclassify subjects that are at high perceived risk of having committed a crime, we would expect that ignoring the selection correction would underestimate the effect of racial differences. After all, when a decision to make a stop occurs rapidly, police officers are more likely to use any implicit bias based on the suspect's characteristics when choosing crime classifications. In other words, where police officers are less certain of the exact crime at the time they make the stop and they are relying on criminal offender profiling to select the crime category, we would underestimate the effect of racial discrimination.
Results
We first present estimates of the hit rates test across different types of crime in Table 3 .
The columns of the table differ based on the level of fixed effects that are included. An important point from Coviello and Persico (2015) is that, as shown in the first row of Table   3 , once accounting for time and precinct fixed effects in columns 6-7, there is no evidence of discrimination when pooling all crimes together. Further, the inclusion of precinct fixed effects leads to an approximate 50% reduction in the magnitude of race on arrest rates. Rows 2-4 present results by subgroups of different crime classifications as previously defined and 27 Bootstrapped Hausman tests would be preferable since they relax the assumption that OLS be fully efficient under the null but are computationally unfeasible in our setting.
shows that the previous result conflates vastly different effects into one which creates the false appearance of no arrest differential. The results indicate that African Americans are significantly less likely to be arrested when stopped for crimes related to the War on Drugs but significantly more likely to be arrested when stopped for other economic crimes with little estimated differential for violent or minor crimes. This is consistent with the conjecture that police officers having different beliefs by racial group and crime type which lead to inefficient policing. Further, we note that adding extra pedestrian and stop characteristics to Equation
(1) as a robustness check has little incidence on the results. Table A2 and Figure A1 in the appendix also show that the estimated arrest differential for War on Drugs crimes is present in every borough in the city (though there is important heterogeneity) and has increased consistently over the period considered in our sample. Table   A4 in the appendix shows that, in the case of summons, the outcome differentials by type of crime are more reflective of the aggregate regression as it is estimated that African Americans are less likely to be issued a summons when stopped for any crime group.
Next, we investigate whether these results may be partly influenced by the endogenous decision of police officers of which type of crime to report. To examine if there is selective classification of crime type in the NYPD Stop-and-Frisk program, Table 4 presents estimates of β 1 from equations (1) and (3) for each crime category defined in Table 1 . These specifications include additional pedestrian and stop characteristics which may also define the selective classification of stops. As shown in Table A3 of the appendix, the number of stops differs across racial groups but also various other characteristics which are likely correlated.
Estimates of the selection-correction model in the second column are noticeably different in economic significance from estimates using the standard hit rates strategy presented in the first column. While African-Americans are statistically less likely at the 1 percent level to be arrested when stopped for War on Drugs related crimes irrespective of whether crime categories are exogenous or a behavioral choice, the estimated coefficient is roughly 15% larger than that which ignores selective choices. For other crime categories, the difference between the two methods are also important both in magnitude and statistical significance.
Making corrections for selective crime classifications leads to a 20% reduction in the magnitude of race on arrest rates for economic crimes and large changes in magnitude for violent and minor crimes which lead to changes in the sign of the estimates and for the latter case, statistical significance.
While our adjusted estimates do not alter the overall conclusion of racial discrimination for War on Drugs crimes, the estimates obtained from the two-stage procedure do suggest that there is non-negligible sample-selection in this context for these crimes as well as others.
The last column in Table 4 reports the p-values from Hausman specification tests of the equality of the estimated coefficient on black between estimates of equations (1) and (3).
For War on Drugs, we observe that the p-values from the Hausman tests are less than 0.01, indicating that we can safely reject the assumption that crime categories are exogenous.
Similarly, for major economic and violent crimes we can clearly reject that this crime category does not reflect a behavioral choice and we can reject the same hypothesis for minor crimes at the 6% level. The results provide evidence that the choice of crime that officers report as the basis for individual stops generates endogenous stratification. Table A4 in the appendix applies the two-stage correction in the case of summons and finds that we can reject the hypothesis that sample-selection is negligible for all crime categories.
Marginal effect estimates from the first stage crime classification selection are presented in Table A5 of the appendix. For each crime classification, the lagged value of daily precinct total stops in that category is positively and significantly related to that respective choice.
Further, each of the variables used to identify the selection correction terms in equation (3) are individually and jointly statistically significant with a plausible sign and magnitude. A somewhat striking finding is that African-Americans are statistically significantly more likely to have their stop categorized as a War on Drugs crime. Estimates of equation (2) also find that blacks are significantly less likely to have their stop categorized as other crime types.
Since the categories underlying War on Drugs crimes can be viewed as representing police officer speculation that a suspect is either hiding a weapon or drugs as opposed to having committed a robbery or trespassing, it is likely that they are easier to use to justify a stop.
Thus, when an officer decides to instantly make a stop based on the suspect's characteristics, the use of this crime classification may also partially reflect implicit bias. Thus, it is not surprising that the estimated effect of racial discrimination on arrest rates for War on Drug crimes increases once the selection correction is used.
Last, we conducted a series of robustness checks shown in Table A6 of the appendix to investigate how the results of the sample-correction procedure vary depending on various assumptions. We find that using different lagged values of the share of stops related to each crime category as the exclusion restriction, which improves the plausibility of the exogeneity assumption, has little incidence on the conclusion. We also find that excluding first stage fixed effects from the correction does alter the estimates of the two-stage procedure but does not change the conclusion that there is a large arrest differential between racial groups for War on Drugs crimes.
Conclusion
The NYC Stop-and-Frisk program often plays a prominent role in debates surrounding racial profiling. Analyses of this data which condition on reported crime type may lead to biased estimates due to endogenous stratification. This stratification may arise since individual police officers could possess unconscious biases, raising concerns that race not only influences whether a police officer decides to stop a pedestrian but also extends to which crime is reported as the basis of the stop. In this paper, we extend the original model underlying KPT to include police officer subjective beliefs regarding a suspect's probability of guilt for different crimes given their race. We show that the traditional hit rates test can be modified to incorporate a selection-correction term from a polychotomous choice model to account for these beliefs. Second, using data from the Stop-and-Frisk program, we show that this correction is empirically important in numerous situations since it reduces the estimated race differentials by 20% -35%.
However, even after applying the selection correction, we concur with prior research that there is strong and robust evidence of discrimination against African-Americans for weapon and drugs related crimes. Since numerous variables measured in both survey and administrative data sets may contain similar non-sampling errors due to misclassification, the econometric methods utilized in this paper could be used in other contexts to ensure the conclusions of the study are not distorted from this source of bias when conducting analyses on endogenous subgroups. In conclusion, this paper demonstrates the importance of researchers accounting for institutional features that guide police officer behavior in the field by illustrating the challenges that arise when applying tests for racial bias across crime types and locations.
More generally, trends related to social movements calling for fundamental changes in the way the federal statistical system classified people by race and gender may increase the risk of misclassification in both survey and administrative datasets. Standard deviations in parentheses The last column presents the p-values from tests where the null hypothesis is that of equality in the probability of arrest between African-Americans and whites. The dependent variable is the probability of being arrested conditional on being stopped and is multiplied by 100. *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses for column 1, bootstrapped (1000 repetitions) and reweighted standard errors in parentheses for column 2. Specifications additionally include fixed effects for precincts and years as well as indicators for gender, youth, height, build and time of day. Column 3 presents the p-values from Hausman specification tests where the null hypothesis is that the estimated coefficient on black is the same across models from columns 1 and 2.
π Appendix 2 Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. The dependent variable is the probability of being issues a summons conditional on being stopped and is multiplied by 100. Extra controls refer to the inclusion of indicators for gender, youth, suspect height and build as well as time of day as defined in Table 1 . The estimated coefficients correspond to the coefficient on black from a set of regressions of the probability of being arrested (multiplied by 100) conditional on being stopped on a dummy for black as well as precinct indicators estimated separately for each year. The standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. The outcome is multiplied by 100. The dashed lines represent the pointwise 95% confidence interval. Standard deviations in parentheses. The last column presents the p-values from tests where the null hypothesis is that of equality in the probability of stop for the four crime categories. The dependent variable is the probability of being issued a summons conditional on being stopped and is multiplied by 100. *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses for column 1, bootstrapped (1000 repetitions) and reweighted standard errors in parentheses for column 2. Specifications additionally include fixed effects for precincts and years as well as indicators for gender, youth, height, build and time of day. Column 3 presents the p-values from Hausman specification tests where the null hypothesis is that the estimated coefficient on black is the same across models from columns 1 and 2. The dependent variable is an aggregate of crime types which takes the value 1 for crimes related to the War on Drugs, 2 for major non-violent crimes, 3 for violent crimes and 4 for minor crimes. *0.1, **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Other Economic refers to economic crimes including trespassing, burglary, robbery, grand larceny and grand larceny auto. Violent refers to violent crimes including rape, murder and assault. Minor refers to minor crimes and includes petit larceny, graffiti and criminal misconduct. Lag crime variables are defined as the proportion of stops that involved crimes of that type in the day before the stop in the same precinct. The exclusion restrictions p-value refers to a joint test of significance for the four exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the probability of being arrested conditional on being stopped and is multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Specifications additionally include fixed effects for precincts and years as well as indicators for gender, youth, height, build and time of day.
